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Roosevelt and the Protest of the 1930s*
Seymour Martin Lipset**
INTRODUCTION
The Great Depression sparked mass discontent and polit-
ical crisis throughout the Western world. The economic break-
down was most severe in the United States and Germany, yet
the political outcome differed markedly in the two countries. In
Germany the government collapsed, ushering the Nazis into
power. In the United States, on the other hand, no sustained
upheaval occurred and political change resulting from the eco-
nomic crisis was apparently limited to the Democrats replacing
the Republicans as the dominant party.' Why was the United
States government able to survive intact the worst depression
in modern times?
Much of the answer lies in the social forces that have his-
torically inhibited class conscious politics in the United States.
Factors such as the unique character of the American class
structure (the result of the absence of feudal hierarchical so-
cial relations in its past), the great wealth of the country, the
* This Article is part of a larger work dealing with the reasons why the
United States is the only industrialized democratic country without a
significant socialist or labor party. For earlier publications by the author on the
subject, see Laslett & Lipset, Social Scientists View the Problem, in FAILURE OF
A DREAM? ESSAYS 3N THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN SOCIALISM 25 (J. Laslett & S.
IUpset eds. 1974); Lipset, American Exceptionalisn, in CAPrrALim AND
SOCIaLSM 34 (M. Novak ed. 1979); Lipset, Radicalism or Reformism." The
Sources of Working-Class Politics, 77 Am. POL. SCL REV. 1 (1983); ipset,
Socialism in America, in SIDNEY HOoK, PHILOSOPHER OF DEMOCRACY AND
HUMANISM 47 (P. Kurtz ed. 1983); IApset, Why is There No Socialism in the
United States?, in RADICALISM IN THE CONTEMPORnY AGE 31 (S. Bialer & S.
Sluzar eds. 1977). I am indebted to Kim Voss for assistance on this Article.
** Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science and Sociology, and
Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
1. The different political experiences of Germany and the United States
in the 1930s are attributable, in part, to the different degrees of legitimacy en-
joyed by the governments of each country. The great majority of the American
population considered the American political system legitimate. In contrast,
large and powerful segments of the German population considered the German
Republic illegitimate. For a discussion of political stability and legitimacy, see
S.M. LIPSET, PornLcAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLrITcs 64-86 (expanded
ed. 1981).
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existence of adult male suffrage prior to industrialization, and
the effects of a two-party electoral system centered on the di-
rect election of the President have made it extremely difficult
for any group to channel social discontent into an independent
third party that appeals to class interests. 2
The Great Depression of the 1930s undermined the impact
of the social and economic factors that traditionally have
defused leftist radicalism in the United States, and a high level
of protest resulted. Nonetheless, the political variables that
press the discontented to work within the two-party system
continued to operate. The effect of these variables was en-
hanced by the masterful political craftsmanship of President
Franklin Roosevelt. He reduced the impact of the widespread
discontent resulting from the Great Depression by co-opting
the leaders and programs of insurgent political movements. Al-
though the logic of the United States' political system has re-
peatedly led the major parties to absorb popular opposition
movements, Roosevelt proved more adept at effecting such ab-
sorption than any other party leader in American history.
The social protest generated by the Great Depression has
passed into history, leaving many unaware of its extent. Analy-
sis of Franklin Roosevelt's role in incorporating this protest
movement into the mainstream of political life requires a famil-
iarity with the political environment in which he acted.
I. SOCIAL DISCONTENT AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN
THE 1930s
President Roosevelt faced protest and anti-capitalist senti-
ment that threatened to undermine the existing political sys-
tem and create new political parties. The findings of diverse
opinion polls, as well as the electoral support given to radical,
progressive, and pro-labor candidates, indicate that a large mi-
nority of Americans were ready to back social-democratic or so-
cialist proposals. Such feelings were harnessed to build
powerful leftist third-party movements in Minnesota, Wiscon-
sin, and New York.3 In other states, radicals successfully ad-
vanced alternative political movements by pursuing a strategy
of running in major-party primaries. In California, Upton Sin-
2. See generally sources cited supra note *.
3. The Farmer-Labor party arose in Minnesota, the Progressive party in
Wisconsin, and the American Labor Party in New York. See infra notes 53-55
and accompanying text. For a good overview of economic protest movements,
see Karsh & Garman, The Impact of the Political Left in LABOR AND THE NEW
DEAL 77 (M. Derber & E. Young eds. 1957).
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clair organized the End Poverty in California (EPIC) move-
ment which won a majority in the 1934 Democratic
gubernatorial primaries. By 1938 former EPIC leaders had cap-
tured the California governorship and a United States Senate
seat.4 In Washington and Oregon, the Commonwealth Federa-
tions, patterning themselves after the social-democratic Coop-
erative Commonwealth Federation of Canada, won a number of
state and congressional posts and controlled the state Demo-
cratic parties for several years.5 In North Dakota, the revived
radical Non-Partisan League, operating within the Republican
party, won the governorship, a United States Senate seat, and
both congressional seats in 1932, and continued to win other
elections throughout the decade.6
The Socialist and Communist parties grew substantially as
well. In 1932 the Socialist party had 15,000 members. Its elec-
toral support, however, was much broader as indicated by the
1932 presidential election in which Norman Thomas received
close to 900,000 votes, up from 267,000 in 1928.7 The Socialist
party's membership increased to 25,000 by 1935. As a result of
leftist enthusiasm for President Roosevelt, however, its presi-
dential vote declined to approximately 188,000 in 1936, fewer
votes than the party had attained in any presidential contest
since 1900.8 The Communist party, on the other hand, backed
President Roosevelt from 1936 on 9 and its membership grew
steadily, numbering between 80,000 and 90,000 at its high point
in 1939.10 According to former party leader Peggy Dennis, Com-
munists played major roles in "left center" electoral coalitions
4. See R. BURKE, OLSON'S NEW DEAL FOR CALIFORNIA 32-33 (1953); W.
LEUCHTENBURG, FRNLm D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 114-15 (1963).
5. See A. Acena, The Washington Commonwealth Federation: Reform
Politics and the Popular Front (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, Uni-
versity of Washington, 1975); J. Herzig, The Oregon Commonwealth Federation:
The Rise and Decline of a Reform Organization (M-A. thesis, Department of
History, University of Oregon, 1963).
6. See E. BLACKORBY, PRAIRIE REBEL: THE PUBLIC LIFE OF WILLIAM
LEMKE 190 (1963); R. MORLAN, PoLIcAL PRAIRIE FIRE 360 (1955).
7. See B. JOHNPOLL, PACIFIST'S PROGRESS: NORMAN THOMAS AND THE DE-
CLINE OF AMERICAN SOcIALISM 57, 96 (1970); S. PETERSEN, A STATISTICAL HIS-
TORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 89, 91 (1981). See auo L.
GOODWYN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE: THE POPULIST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (1976).
8. By 1940 the Socialist vote had fallen to 116,514. See S. PETERSEN, supra
note 7, at 97.
9. See infra notes 67-69, 76-88, and accompanying text.
10. Both Michael Harrington, Socialist party leader, and Earl Browder,
chairperson of the Communist party during the 1930s, suggest that the Commu-
nist party grew to be the larger party because it was willing to work within the
two-party system. In comparing the strategy of the Communist party with that
of the anti-New Deal Socialists, Browder argued:
1983]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
in four states and had significant influence in thirty-one others,
mainly within the Democratic party." Although the latter esti-
mate is probably exaggerated, considerable evidence attests to
the Communist party's strength in California, Minnesota, New
York, and Washington.12
Labor groups gained unprecedented support as they pio-
neered new tactics and built organizations that were militant in
ways previously unknown in American society. A wave of sit-
down strikes successfully unionized mass production indus-
tries, such as automobile and steel.13 Organizations of the un-
employed, often with Communist party leadership, developed
radical strategies to influence the government to ease the plight
The Communist party, on the other hand, rapidly moved out of its
extreme leftist sectarianism of 1930 .... It relegated its revolutionary
socialist goals to the ritual of chapel and Sundays on the pattern long
followed by the Christian Church. On weekdays it became the most
single-minded practical reformist party that America ever produced.
Thus the Socialist party, despite its initial advantages over the Com-
munists, lost ground steadily to them ....
[The Socialists] learned nothing... from the spectacular capture
of the Democratic party primary in California by Upton Sinclair's EPIC
[End Poverty in California] movement .... They repeated all their
failures but none of their successes. It was left to the Communists to
learn from their successes; e.g., they copied Sinclair's EPIC movement
and largely absorbed its remains ....
Browder, The American Communist Party in the Thirties, in As WE SAW THE
THTIEs 237-38 (R. Simon ed. 1967).
Similarly, Michael Harrington noted that the Socialists, by insisting "on the
traditional model of the Socialist party as an electoral alternative... missed
participating in the most important political development in the history of the
American working class." M. HARRINGTON, SOCIALISM 262 (1972). Harrington
further stated that had the party followed Norman Thomas's advice in 1938 to
cease running candidates, "it might have been able to maintain some kind of
serious base in the unions. But it did not, and Socialists like Walter Reuther,
when confronted with the choice between the party's political tactic and that of
the labor movement itself, unhesitatingly chose the latter. The tragedy was
that the two were counterposed." Id. at 262-63. For membership figures, as es-
timated by Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, see I. HowE & L. COSER, THE AmERI-
CAN COMMNIST PARTY: A CarIcAL HISTORY 386 (1957). The Communist party
claimed 100,000 members by early 1939, although Philip Jaffe explains that "the
total membership ... never went beyond 70,000 (plus about 30,000 Young Com-
munist League members)." P. JAFFE, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN COImu-
NISM 11 (1975).
11. See P. DENNIS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN AMERICAN COMMuNST A
PERSONAL VIEW OF A POLIrcAL LIFE, 1925-1975, at 122 (1977).
12. See H. KLEHR, THE HEYDAY OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM: THE DEPRES-
SION DECADE ch. 14 (1984).
13. For a recent overview of labor organization during the 1930s, see Davis,
The Barren Marriage of American Labour and the Democratic Party, 124 NEW
LEFT REV. 43 (1980). See also I. BERNSTEIN, THE TURBULEN r YEARS (1970); D.
BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS ON THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
STRUGGLE ch. 4 (1980); J. GREEN, THE WORLD OF THE WORKER: LABOR IN TWEN-
TIETH-CENTuRy AMERICA (1980).
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of the jobless; risking arrest, they resisted evictions, sat in at
relief bureaus, and organized mass hunger marches.14
In addition, the decade witnessed the emergence of large-
scale social movements led by Senator Huey Long of Louisiana
and Father Charles Coughlin of Michigan. Although each
man's orientation has been described as fascist, abundant evi-
dence indicates that Long's appeal was primarily as a leftist
critic of the system and, prior to 1936, many perceived Coughlin
as a leftist opponent of the banking system and of capitalism,
although he eventually turned to overt anti-Semitism and open
admiration of European fascist dictators.15
Huey Long's highly publicized "Share-Our-Wealth" plan,
for example, had many radical elements. The plan involved
100% taxation of all family wealth in excess of $5,000,000 and all
income in excess of $1,000,000 a year. Furthermore, the govern-
ment was to guarantee each American family a "homestead" of
$5,000 and an "annual income of $2,000 to $3,000 a year." Sena-
tor Long's plan also called for a reduction of the work week to
thirty hours and the work year to eleven months.16
Although the Share-Our-Wealth plan found adherents in
every state, its greatest appeal outside of Long's home region
was in Midwest, Mountain, and Pacific Coast states-primarily
in those sectors of the population predisposed to the political
left. A state-by-state comparison of the percentage of people
who in 1935 said they would vote for Huey Long for President
with the vote actually received by Eugene Debs in 1912, Robert
LaFollette Sr. in 1924, and Norman Thomas in 1932 indicates
that Long's support correlated significantly with support for
these earlier Socialist and Progressive presidential candi-
dates.'7 His appeal, moreover, was clearly class-linked. Al-
though the 1935 survey did not inquire into the occupational or
socioeconomic status of the respondents, questionnaires were
divided between those completed by voters receiving govern-
14. For an interesting account of such tactics and the growth of black pro-
test, see Naison, Harlem Communists and the Politics of Black Protest, MARXIST
PERSPEcTrIVEs, Fall 1978, at 20.
15. See S.AL LIPSET & E. RAAB, THE PoLrrIcs OF UNREASON: RIGHT-WING
ExREasM IN AmEicA, 1790-1977, at 167-99 (2d ed. 1978); & McElvaine, Thun-
der Without Lightning; Working Class Discontent in the United States, 1929-
1937, at 217-31, 237-48 (Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History, State Univer-
sity of New York at Binghamton, 1974).
16. See T. WnjuAs, HUEY LONG 693 (1969). See also A. BRIuNK=Y, VOICES
OF PROTEST HuEy LONG, FATHER COUGHLN, AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 71-74
(1982).
17. Earl Raab and I correlated these percentages from the results of a
large-scale opinion poll. See S.M. LIPSET & E. RAAB, supra note 15, at 192.
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ment assistance and others. In the thirty states for which such
differentiated data were collected, Long received the support of
16% of the less privileged voters compared to 8% of the more
affluent voters. As might be expected, a large majority of re-
spondents backing Huey Long for President had voted for
Franklin Roosevelt in 1932.18
The Reverend Charles Coughlin hosted a weekly national
radio program in which he preached that bankers were the
source of all evil, including international tensions, and that sil-
ver was "the key to world prosperity."19 The extent of Cough-
lin's support is indicated by his estimated weekly audience of
thirty to forty-five million listeners by 1932. By 1934 Coughlin
was receiving the largest volume of mail of any person in the
United States, including the President.20 His base of support,
although always predominantly Catholic, varied over time.
Analysis of the earliest available opinion polls indicates that,
religious identification apart, in 1938 Coughlin drew support pri-
marily from the less privileged and others who "were... dis-
contented with their lot, with the economic state of the country,
and with prospects for the future."21
Evidence from national surveys suggests that the leftward
shift in public opinion during the 1930s was much more exten-
sive than third-party voting or membership in radical organiza-
tions indicated. Although large leftist third parties existed only
in Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin, three Gallup polls
taken between December 1936 and January 1938 found that be-
tween 14 and 16% of those polled said they "would join," not
merely vote for, a Farmer-Labor party if one were organized.
Of those interviewees expressing an opinion in 1937, 21%
voiced a readiness to join a new party.22 In a Roper poll taken
in 1942 for Fortune magazine, 25% of the respondents agreed
that "some form of Socialism would be a good thing ... for the
country as a whole," compared with 40% who said it would be a
bad thing.23 No other survey conducted during this time period
explicitly inquired about socialism, but a 1936 Roper/Fortune
poll found that a majority of respondents favored public owner-
18. See id. at 191-94.
19. See A. BmunXEY, supra note 16, at 120.
20. See W. LEUCHTENBTURG, supra note 4, at 100.
21. See S.M. LIPSET & E. RAAB, supra note 15, at 177. See also id. at 179,
185.
22. Percentages were calculated from polls reported in PUBLIC OPINION,
1935-1946, at 576-77 (H. Cantril ed. 1951).
23. See id. at 802.
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ship of various utilities: 56% of those polled supported public
ownership of electric lights, 55% called for such ownership of
gas, 50% for telephones, and 49% for trolleys and buses. 24 A
Gallup survey taken in 1937 indicated that 41% of the respon-
dents supported government ownership of banks.25
Other public opinion surveys revealed that the economic
malaise of the 1930s produced sharp antagonism toward great
wealth and corporate power.26 Moreover, a clearly identifiable
class-based division in attitudes emerged: the less affluent
strata, measured by both socioeconomic status and occupation,
perceived redistributionist policies, government ownership, and
welfare policies more favorably than did the well-to-do.27
The Great Depression produced a substantial change in the
attitudes of many Americans toward the traditional economic
system. Yet, although millions of Americans may have been
ready for a new radical party, the 1930s produced neither a
party nor a movement committed to socialism or social democ-
racy in the United States.
HI. THIRD PARTIES AND THE AMERICAN ELECTORAL
SYSTEM
The American electoral system itself played an important
role in preventing the emergence of a third party. The United
States differs from parliamentary countries in that its executive
branch cannot be divided in a multi-party coalition. Instead,
the United States' political system overwhelmingly focuses on
24. See id. at 694.
25. See S.M. LIPSET & W. SCHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE GAP: BUSINESS, LA-
BOR, AND GovERNmEN n T E PUBLIC MIND 283 (1983).
26. In 1937 Ferdinand Lundberg posited that "[t]he United States is owned
and dominated by a hierarchy of its sixty richest families." F. LUNDBERG,
AMERICA'S 60 FAMIzES 3 (1937). A Roper/Fortune poll taken in early 1938
sought to determine the extent to which the American public accepted Lund-
berg's widely discussed point of view. Of those persons polled, 29% believed
that "60 families control most of the economic life of this country," 10% be-
lieved this statement was partly true, and an additional 13.5 % indicated
"maybe not 60, but a very small number." The Fortune Quarterly Survey: XII,
FORTUNE, Apr. 1938, at 99, 102, 104.
27. For an indication of public opinion in the late 1930s regarding the redis-
tribution of wealth, by socioeconomic status and wealth, see The Fortune Sur-
vey: XXII, FORTUNE, June 1939, at 68; The Fortune Quarterly Survey: X,
FORTUNE, Oct. 1937, at 108, 154. For attitudes during this period with respect to
government responsibility for employment, by socioeconomic status and race,
see The Fortune Survey: XXII, FORTUNE, June 1939, at 68; The Fortune Survey,
FORTUNE, July 1935, at 66, 67. For a measure of public opinion in 1939 dealing
with government provision of welfare, by socioeconomic status and race, see
The Fortune Survey: XXII, FORTUNE, June 1939, at 68.
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one winner capturing the Presidency in a national contest.
Such a focus greatly strengthens a two-party system. 28 Simi-
larly, the system of primary elections and the absence of party
discipline in Congress- enables individuals with sharply diverse
views to run for and hold office under the same party label.
These factors have produced two parties that are broad coali-
tions of heterogeneous, often conflicting groupings. The two
major parties have repeatedly responded to or co-opted move-
ments and tendencies expressive of discontent. Invariably,
such reactions have sufficiently convinced extra-partisan
protestors either that one of the major parties substantially
represents their position or that the two major parties respond
so dissimilarly to the issues that it makes a significant differ-
ence which nominee or party wins the election. Consequently,
support of a third-party strategy has not been viewed as a real-
istic means of electing third-party nominees. Instead, it is seen
as diluting support for the major-party candidate whose views
are most compatible with those of the potential supporters of
the third party, thereby aiding the election of the candidate
they most oppose.
Thus, the impact of the American electoral system has
been to undercut third parties. Significant third-party move-
ments emerge in the United States when groups, interests, or
factions believe that they are being ignored by both major par-
ties-that neither party is "the lesser of two evils" or a more
positive good. But after the dissidents have demonstrated the
intensity of their feeling, one or both of the major-party coali-
tions generally respond sympathetically by advocating appro-
priate policies, by symbolically endorsing the movement, or
often by nominating candidates who speak the language of the
protest. For instance, in the 1890s the Democrats absorbed the
growing Populist party by nominating near-Populist William
Jennings Bryan for President and by drawing up a platform
that included Populist demands and rhetoric. 29
The different histories of third parties in the 1930s in the
United States and Canada demonstrate the importance of the
28. E.E. Schattschneider, the most sophisticated analyst of the factors sus-
taining the two-party system, stressed that "[t]he American two-party system
is the direct consequence of the American election system." E.
SCHATrSCHNEIDER, PARTY GovmERsmNT 69 (1942). See also S.M. LIPSET, THE
FIRST NEW NATION: THE UNITED STATES IN HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PER-
SPECTIVE 286-317 (rev. ed. 1979); N. THoMAs, SOCIALISM ON THE DEFENSIVE 281
(1938).
29. See J. -icKs, THE POPULIST REVOLT: A HISTORY OF THE FARMERS' AL-
LIANCE AND THE PEOPLE'S PARTY 354, 358 (1961).
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American electoral system in undermining such groups. Al-
though Canada's social structure, particularly in the English-
speaking parts, is similar to that of the United States, socialists
made more headway in the United States than in Canada in the
early decades of this century. The proportionately weaker Ca-
nadian socialist and labor party movements lacked national or-
ganization and splintered, until the 1930s, among a variety of
small regionally based sects. They were able nonetheless to
forge an electorally significant socialist party out of the discon-
tent of the 1930s-the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
(CCF), which survives today as the New Democratic Party
(NDP). This party's success was made possible in large part
by Canada's parliamentary system, which permitted the CCF
to build a national movement by concentrating its resources on
elections in those parliamentary districts where socialists had
strength. As a result, the CCF was not forced to wage a viable
national campaign before becoming a significant third party in
terms of parliamentary representation. 30
Although constitutional factors were an important impedi-
ment to the emergence of an American socialist or social-demo-
cratic party in the 1930s, such factors alone cannot account for
the effect of the political system on the failure of American so-
cialism during the Great Depression. Major-party coalitions
must make conscious policy adjustments to hold or win the dis-
contented. They must respond to or co-opt those who are not
with them, and Franklin Roosevelt proved to be extraordinarily
skilled at such tactics.
EI. THIRD PARTIES AND A MASTER POLITICIAN
President Roosevelt worked consciously to incorporate all
forms of protest into his New Deal coalition. He used two basic
tactics. First, he responded in policy and rhetoric to the de-
mands of the various outgroups. Second, he absorbed the lead-
ers of these groups into his following.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF PROGRESSIVE POLICIES
Franklin Roosevelt demonstrated his skill at co-opting the
rhetoric and demands of the opposition the year before his 1936
reelection. Huey Long threatened to run on a third-party
30. See Lipset, Radicalism in North America: A Comparative View of the
Party System in Canada and the United States, 14 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL
SOCIETY OF CANADA 19, 38 (1976).
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Share-Our-Wealth ticket.3 1 This possibility worried the Presi-
dent and his campaign chairman, James Farley, because a "se-
cret" public opinion poll conducted in 1935 for the Democratic
National Committee suggested that Long might get "between
3,000,000 to 4,000,000 votes at the head of a third party."32
Roosevelt and Farley feared that if Long ran as a third-party
candidate the President would lose a number of states. 33 The
President was also concerned because progressive senators
"like LaFollette, Cutting, Nye, etc.... [were] flirting with the
idea of a third ticket," and as a result he believed that the 1936
election might witness both a "third Progressive Republican
ticket [headed by Robert LaFollette] and a fourth 'Share-Our-
Wealth' ticket."3 4
To prevent a third party from emerging, and to win the sup-
port of more left-oriented people, Roosevelt shifted to the left
in rhetoric and to some extent in policy, consciously seeking to
"steal the thunder" of his populist critics.35 In discussions con-
cerning radical and populist anti-capitalist protest, the Presi-
dent stated that to save capitalism from its opponents he would
have to "equalize the distribution of wealth," which might ne-
cessitate "throw[ing] to the wolves the forty-six men who are
reported to have incomes in excess of one million dollars a
year."3 6 Moreover, Roosevelt responded to "the share-our-
wealth clamor" by advancing tax reforms designed to stop "an
unjust concentration of wealth and economic power."37 Attack-
ing "the perpetuation of great and undesirable concentration of
control in a relatively few individuals over the employment and
welfare of many, many others," he complained specifically
about "the disturbing effects upon our national life that come
from inheritance of wealth and power."38 The President pro-
posed, therefore, to raise income and dividend taxes, to enact a
31. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
32. J. FARLEY, Jim FARLEY'S STORY: THE ROOSEVELT YEARS 51 (1948).
33. See 1 H. IcKEs, THiE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES: THE FRST
THOusAND DAYS, 1933-1936, at 462 (1953); J. FARLEY, BEHIND THE BALLOTS 250
(1938).
34. Letter from Franklin Roosevelt to Edward House (Feb. 16, 1935), re-
printed in 1 F.D.R., His PERSONAL LETTERS, 1928-1945, at 452-53 (E. Roosevelt
ed. 1950). See also P. MANEY, "YOUNG BOB" LAFoLLETTE 162 (1978).
35. Early in 1935, President Roosevelt "actually used the phrase 'steal
Long's thunder"' in a conversation with Raymond Moley and others. R.
MOLEY, AFrER SEVEN YEARS 305 (1939).
36. See 3 A. SCHLESINGER JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEELT: THE POLrICS OF
UPHEAVAL 325-26, 328-29 (1960).
37. Id. at 328.
38. Id.
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sharply graduated inheritance tax, and to use tax policy to dis-
criminate against large corporations. Huey Long reacted by
charging that the President was stealing his program and
"copying [his] share-the-wealth speeches." 39
President Roosevelt also became more overtly supportive
of trade unions, although he had not supported the most impor-
tant piece of labor legislation, Senator Robert Wagner's labor
relations bill, until shortly before its passage.4 0 The bill 'threw
the weight of government behind the right of labor to bargain
collectively, and compelled employers to accede peacefully to
the unionization of their plants. It imposed no reciprocal obli-
gations of any kind on unions." 4 1
Raymond Moley, an organizer of President Roosevelt's
"brain trust" who later defected from the administration, em-
phasized that the President, through these and other policies
and statements, sought to identify himself with the objectives
of the unemployed, minorities, and farmers, as well as "the
growing membership of the C.I.O., Norman Thomas' vanishing
army of orthodox Socialists, Republican progressives and
Farmer-Laborites, Share-the-Wealthers, single-taxers, Sinclair-
ites, Townsendites, [and] Coughlinites."42
B. ABSORIrON OF LEFTIST LEADERS
Beyond a strategy of offering progressive policies in ex-
change for support from leftist and economically depressed
constituencies, President Roosevelt also sought to recruit the
leaders of protest and radical groups by convincing them that
they were part of his coalition. He gave those who held public
office access to federal patronage, particularly in Minnesota,
Wisconsin, and New York where strong state-wide third parties
existed. This strategy had an impact: in 1937 when Philip La-
Follette was the Progressive governor of Wisconsin, his execu-
tive secretary told Daniel Hoan, the Socialist mayor of
Milwaukee, that a national third party never would be launched
while Roosevelt was "in the saddle," because Roosevelt had
"put so many outstanding liberals 'on his payroll' that any
'third party movement would lack sufficient leadership.'- 43
39. Id. at 329.
40. W. LEUCI-1ENBURG, supra note 4, at 151.
41. Id.
42. R. MOLEY, supra note 35, at 351.
43. L. Schmidt, The Farmer-Labor Progressive Federation: The Study of a
"United Front" Movement Among Wisconsin Liberals, 1934-1941, at 375 (Ph.D.
dissertation, Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 1954).
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The President gave these leaders strong indications that he
was on their side and that his conscious, ultimate goal was to
transform the Democratic party into an ideologically coherent
progressive party in which they could hope to play a leading
role, in some cases possibly by succeeding him.44 He even, on
rare occasions, implied that to secure ideological realignment,
he might go the third-party route, following in the footsteps of
his cousin, Theodore Roosevelt. In addition, Franklin Roosevelt
did not hesitate to support electorally powerful non-Democrats,
including Minnesota Governor Floyd Olson, New York City
Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, and Nebraska Senator George Nor-
ris, as well as Wisconsin Governor Philip LaFollette and his
brother, Senator Robert LaFollette Jr.45
The President used similar tactics to recruit leaders of the
labor movement. His primary appeal to them was his adminis-
tration's support of union organization drives. Equally impor-
tant, particularly for the more politicized progressive and
socialist sectors, were the President's welfare-state economic
planning measures, designed to reduce unemployment, raise
wages, reduce working hours, and support the aged and the un-
employed. Beyond these measures, however, Roosevelt also ef-
fectively employed the tactics of co-optation, and status and
power recognition. He invited labor leaders to meet with him
and exhibited a greater willingness than any previous Presi-
dent to speak at labor meetings. He "always sent elaborate
greetings to every CIO and AFL convention, and often to the
conventions of large constituent unions." 46 During the 1938
mid-term election campaign, President Roosevelt went out of
his way to praise Michigan Governor Frank Murphy's pro-
union conduct during "the sit-down crisis."4 7 Eleanor
Roosevelt's frequent speeches at union conventions further
aided the President's cause.4 8
Roosevelt's impact on union leaders, even early in his Pres-
idency, is evidenced by a speech given by Van Bittner, a min-
ers union leader, at a union convention in the mid-1930s:
I, too, remember those dreary days prior to 1933. I was in Washing-
44. See P. MANEY, supra note 34, at 190; R. TUGWELL, THE DEMOCTRATC
ROOSEVELT 409-15 (1957).
45. See, e.g., G. MAYER, THE POLrCAL CAREER OF FLOYD B. OLSON 240-41
(1951).
46. W. Riker, The CIO in Politics, 1936-1946, at 35 (Ph.D. dissertation, De-
partment of Government, Harvard University, 1948).
47. See McSeveney, The Michigan Gubernatorial Campaign of 1938, 45
MICH. HIST. 97, 115 (1961).
48. See W. Riker, supra note 46, at 35.
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ton when Harding was President, I was there when Coolidge was Presi-
dent, I was there when Hoover was President, begging like a blind man
with a tin cup for the Government to do something to help labor. And I
never heard the tinkle of a single coin in that cup during those years.
Early in 1933 I visited the White House with... Philip Murray,
and our old friend John Lewis, and Tom Kennedy .... At that time
our union did not have enough members to pay the officers and during
the course of that interview with the President he said this, "Boys, go
home and have a good night's sleep because if I don't do anything else
during my administration as President of the United States I am going
to give the miners an opportunity to organize in the United Mine Work-
ers of America."
Well, for a week I just was in sort of a daze ....
[C]ertainly after that I was for the President, and nothing he has
done since would cause me to be against him.
4 9
Other reports further indicate Roosevelt's influence on
union leaders. A semiofficial biography of Sidney Hillman, an
important leader of the Congress of Industrial Organizations
(C.I.O.), and president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers,
boasted about his "intimacy" with the President, claiming that
he "was numbered among the dozen or so of Americans who
were the President's most trusted political friends."5 0 United
Mine Workers and C.I.O. president John L. Lewis, speaking to
his biographer in 1940 after a long period of quarreling with
Roosevelt, invidiously described the President's tactics of co-
opting C.I.O. leaders, which undermined Lewis's ability to or-
ganize labor opposition:
He has been carefully selecting my key lieutenants and appointing
them to honorary posts in various of his multitudinous, grandiose com-
missions. He has his lackeys fawning upon and wining and dining
many of my people. At proper intervals he has unveiled to them the
glory of admission to the White House and permitted them to bask in
his presence....
In a quiet, confidential way he approaches one of my lieutenants,
weans his loyalty away, overpowers him with the dazzling glory of the
White House, and appoints him to a federal post under such circum-
stances that his prime loyalty shall be to the President and only a sec-
ondary, residual one to the working-class movement from which he
came... 51
The active role Roosevelt took in creating the American La-
bor Party (A.L.P.) in New York evidences his conscious con-
cern with winning socialist unionists for his coalition. New
York, particularly New York City, had a long history of
electorally strong radical movements: hundreds of thousands
49. Id. at 16-17.
50. M. JOSEPHSON, SiDNEY HLMAN: STATESMAN OF AMERICAN LABOR 453-
54 (1952).
51. S. ALisKy, JOHN L. LEwiS 182-84 (1949).
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of New Yorkers regularly voted for leftist third-party candi-
dates.5 2 In an effort to win over these votes, President
Roosevelt, at the urging of Sidney Hillman, Fiorello LaGuardia,
and Eleanor Roosevelt, helped to initiate a state-wide third
party, the A.L.P. This newly created party was to nominate
Roosevelt and other New Deal Democrats on its own separate
ballot line, thus permitting "Socialists and others on the left to
vote for Democratic candidates on a non-Democratic slate."53
James Farley and Edward Flynn, the Democratic party leaders,
initially opposed this proposal, worrying that they would be
creating the basis for a rival party. Roosevelt, however, told
Farley to order Democratic party clubs to help gather the peti-
tions necessary to put the new party on the ballot.5 4
The payoff for these efforts can be seen in the resignations
from the Socialist party of various union officials. The A.L.P.
refused to allow the Socialists to affiliate as a unit, a condition
set by the Socialist party in 1924 for supporting a labor or
farmer-labor party. Hence, Roosevelt supporters, such as Sid-
ney Hillman and David Dubinsky, left the Socialist party and
actively recruited radicals for Roosevelt. Hillman described his
rationale at a 1936 union meeting:
52. W. Moscow, PoLrcs I THE EsMsm1. STATE 105 (1948).
53. I. BERNSTEwi, supra note 13, at 449. See also J. Bakunin, The Role of
Socialists in the Formation of the American Labor Party 5-6 (M.A. thesis, De-
partment of History, City College of New York, 1965); R. Carter, Pressure from
the Left: The American Labor Party, 1936-1954, at 16-17 (Ph.D. dissertation, De-
partment of History, Syracuse University, 1965); W. Stewart, A Political History
of the American Labor Party 3-5 (MA. thesis, Department of Political Science,
American University, 1959).
54. See W. Moscow, supra note 52, at 105; D. SAPoss, COmmUNIsM IN AMER-
ICAN POLITCs 70 (1960); R. Carter, supra note 53, at 11-14. Edward Flynn has
described the origin of the American Labor Party as follows:
President Roosevelt with Jim Farley and myself, brought the
American Labor Party into being. It was entirely Roosevelt's sugges-
tion. Farley and I never believed in it very much, but he felt at the
time-and it is true today-that there were many people who believed
in what Roosevelt stood for but who, for some reason or other ...
would not join the Democratic Party. If another party were created,
you could bring these people into it actively. That was really why it
was created....
Sidney Hillman and David Dubinsky played a great part in it and
we couldn't have formed the party without them. They were the nu-
cleus. These and other people were names but the voting strength was
from the unions that were controlled by Dubinsky and Hillman.
... At that time both of those unions were rather leftist-more so than
the Democratic Party. There again it would attract a great many more
who would ... vote for Roosevelt who might not have voted at all.
E. Flynn, The Reminiscences of Edward J. Flynn (interviewed by Owen Bom-
bard, Mar. 1950, Oral History Project, Butler Library, Columbia University),
quoted in R. Carter, supra note 53, at 13-14.
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We have had a policy, which was not to endorse either of the two
political parties, and that if we took a position it should be along Social-
ist lines. The position of our organization is known: that we are for a
labor party. We are today bound ... to help bring about a labor or
farmer-labor party-what is commonly known as independent political
action.
But [since Roosevelt took office in 1933,] things have happened
.... We have participated in making the labor policy of this
Administration.
We know that the defeat of the Roosevelt Administration means no
labor legislation for decades to come .... I don't know whether legis-
lation would put all the unemployed back to work, but we do know in
our industry that the reduction in hours took in 50,000... and with im-
provement in business and farm income we would have 175,000 in our
industry. A change in the Administration raises a definite question
whether the Amalgamated would have to fight completely on its own
and not get the support which it enjoyed under the NRA [National Re-
covery Administration].-55
David Dubinsky, head of the International Ladies Garment
Workers, resigned from the Socialist party early in 1936 after
twenty-five years of membership.5 6 He explained this emotion-
ally difficult decision as follows:
Franklin Delano Roosevelt is the first truly progressive President
we have had in this generation. The NRA... has... given positive
and concrete help to the labor movement ... [.] We must bear in mind
that all enemies of labor are now combining against the New Deal,
against FDR, and that means against labor ... [.] An FDR defeat,
therefore, must be avoided at all costs.5
7
1. Eleanor Roosevelt's Role in Co-Opting the Left
Eleanor Roosevelt played a crucial role in President
Roosevelt's efforts to secure the backing of the Left and other
discontented elements of American society. With his encour-
agement, she became the President's emissary to these groups.
She spent time with black organizations, publicly supported
their causes, and invited their leaders to the White House.5 8
She exhibited concern for the plight of persecuted Jews in Eu-
rope and headed a committee to settle Jewish children in Pal-
estine.59 She willingly spoke to and helped organizations such
as the Workers Alliance and youth and student groups "in
which the Communists were active" and often rallied to their
55. M. JOSEPHSON, supra note 50, at 397 (emphasis added).
56. William Leuchtenburg notes that "[t]he defection of Socialist union
leaders, and the immense appeal of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, all but de-
stroyed the Socialist party." W. LEUCHrENBURG, supra note 4, at 188.
57. M. DANIsH, THE WORLD OF DAVID DUBiNsKY 94 (1957).
58. See J. LASH, ELEANOR ROosEvELT: A FRIEND's MEMOIR 171-72 (1964).
59. See id. at 80-81, 83.
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defense.60 According to one source, when friends "talked to her
about the need for a third party, she would gently correct them:
'What we need is not a third party but a new party.' She would
urge them to... help reform and transform the Democrats."61
During the 1936 election campaign, Democratic party
chairperson Ed Flynn deeply involved Eleanor Roosevelt be-
cause he was "keenly aware of [her] strength and popularity
with the New Deal sections of the Roosevelt coalition-women,
young people, Negroes, labor, and the Independents." 62 For in-
stance, although the President occasionally acted in ways that
angered blacks,63 Walter White of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) remained com-
mitted to the President, largely, according to his own report,
because of Eleanor Roosevelt's involvement in the cause.64
C. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S 1936 CAMPAIGN
Franklin Roosevelt ran his 1936 presidential campaign as a
progressive coalition, not as a Democratic party activity. Ar-
thur Schlesinger Jr. has described Roosevelt's tactics as
follows:
As the campaign developed, the Democratic party seemed more and
more submerged in the New Deal coalition. The most active campaign-
ers in addition to Roosevelt-Ickes, Wallace, Hugh Johnson-were men
identified with the New Deal, not with the professional Democratic or-
ganization. Loyalty to the cause superseded loyalty to the party as the
criterion for administration support. In Minnesota, the Democratic
ticket thus withdrew in favor of the Farmer-Labor ticket; in Nebraska,
Roosevelt ignored the Democratic candidate and endorsed George Nor-
ris; in Wisconsin, the New Deal worked with the Progressives; in Mas-
sachusetts, the administration declined to back James M. Curley, the
60. See J. LASH, ELEANOR AND FRANKLiN 595 (1971).
61. J. LAsH, supra note 58, at 171.
62. Id.
63. The discontent among black leaders resulting from the President's re-
straint in supporting a federal anti-lynching bill has been described as follows:
Negro leaders also rebuked Roosevelt for the failure of New Deal
Congresses to enact civil rights legislation. After a recrudescence of
lynching in 1933, the N.A.C.P. drafted a federal antilynching bill,
which was introduced in 1934 by Senators Costigan and Wagner. New
lynchings in that year intensified the plea for federal action.... The
President denounced lynching and was willing, after some urging, to
support a vote on an antilynching measure, so long as it did not tie up
other reform legislation. But he refused to make it "must" legislation,
for, if he did, Southern committee chairmen might kill every economic
proposal he asked them to advance. Without the President's help, sup-
porters of the bill failed to break a filibuster of southern Democrats
abetted by Senator Borah.
W. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 4, at 186. See also F. FREIDEL, F.D.R. AND TE
SouTH 82-90 (1965).
64. See W. WHITE, A MAN CALLED WHMIE 168-69 (1948).
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Democratic candidate for senator. It was evident that the basis of the
campaign would be the mobilization beyond the Democratic party of all
the elements in the New Deal coalition-liberals, labor, farmers, wo-
men, minorities. To do this required the elaborate structure of subsidi-
ary organizations and committees which Roosevelt began urging on
Farley as early as January 1936.65
These subsidiary committees promoted by President Roosevelt
included Labor's Non-Partisan League and the Progressive Na-
tional Committee, headed by Senator Robert LaFollette Jr.,
which counted Farmer-Labor Governor Elmer Benson of Min-
nesota, Independent Progressive Senator George Norris of Ne-
braska, radical Farmer-Labor Progressive Congressman
Thomas Amlie of Wisconsin, Washington Commonwealth Sena-
tor Lewis Schwellenbach, and A.L.P. Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia
of New York City among its members. Separate groups also or-
ganized women and blacks.66
Although Huey Long's assassination in September 1935
ended the direct challenge of the Share-Our-Wealth plan, Presi-
dent Roosevelt continued his co-opting tactics throughout his
1936 reelection campaign. The progressive theme of the cam-
paign, its appeal to populist anti-elitist, anti-business senti-
ment, was summed up in Roosevelt's last major campaign
speech:
We had to struggle with the old enemies of peace-business and
financial monopoly, speculation, reckless banking, class antagonism,
sectionalism, war profiteering.
They had begun to consider the Government of the United States
as a mere appendage to their own affairs. We know now that Govern-
ment by organized money is just as dangerous as Government by or-
ganized mob.
Never before in all our history have these forces been so united
against one candidate as they stand today. They are unanimous in
their hate of me-and I welcome their hatred.
I should like to have it said of my first Administration that in it the
forces of selfishness and of lust for power met their match. I should
like to have it said of my second Administration that in it these forces
met their master.67
D. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S SEcoND TERm
Roosevelt was reelected by an overwhelming majority in
1936--he carried every state except Maine and Vermont. Yet
his second term proved much less innovative than his first.
This was due, in part, to several Supreme Court decisions dur-
65. A. SCHLESINGER JR., .supra note 36, at 592.
66. See id. at 592-600.
67. R. MOLEY, =rpra note 35, at 351-52.
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ing the 1936 Term striking various New Deal laws as unconsti-
tutional and the President's subsequent inability to mobilize
popular protest against the Court. Reacting to an apparent
shift in the public mood to the right, particularly from 1938 on,
Roosevelt substantially reduced his reform efforts. The change,
however, did not lead to a loss of leftist support. The Commu-
nist party, as a result of its Popular Front policy,68 experienced
increasing membership, control of large front groups, power in
the labor movement, and considerable strength in various left-
ist political groups. The Communists strongly and uncritically
backed the President because of his anti-fascist, collective-se-
curity foreign policy. In addition, the Communists actively op-
posed efforts in a number of states to create independent,
radical anti-Roosevelt political campaigns. 69
1. Progressive Party Failures
On the assumption that the 1937-38 recession had under-
mined Roosevelt's prestige, Wisconsin Governor Philip LaFol-
lette attempted in 1938 to create a new third party, the National
Progressives of America. The President responded with a re-
newed effort to co-opt such opposition. He told Harold Ickes in
May 1938 that he hoped to handle the problem by "a little confi-
dential... talking with [Philip's brother, Wisconsin Senator]
Bob La Follette." 7o As recorded by Ickes in his diary:
What he indicated that he would say to La Follette was that their Pro-
gressive movement was all right if they didn't get too far out.
He has it in mind, as 1940 approaches, to make overtures to the La
Follettes and the Farmer-Labor group in Minnesota. He would be will-
ing to make a deal with the La Follettes as the result of which Bob La
Follette could go into the next Cabinet as Secretary of State....
[T]hen Phil could go into the Senate and this would take care of both
of them....
[The President further indicated that] [s]omething also could be
done to bring in the Farmer-Labor group.71
The mid-term elections in November 1938, however, made it
unnecessary for President Roosevelt to react to a possible elec-
68. Prior to 1935 the Communists had engaged in a policy of independent
political action. From 1935 on, however, under the slogan of the Popular Front,
the Communist policy underwent a transformation. The Communists made ef-
forts to work "under the New Deal umbrella in both the Democratic party and
the Washington bureaucracy." Derber, The New Deal and Labor, in THE NEw
DEAL: THE NATIONAL LEVEL 128 (J. Braeman, R. Brenner & D. Brody eds. 1975).
69. See H. KLEHR, supra note 12, at ch. 12.
70. 2 H. ICKES, THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L, ICKES: THE INSIDE STRUG-
GLE, 1936-1939, at 395 (1954).
71. Id.
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toral threat from the Left. Both the Wisconsin Progressive
party and the Minnesota Farmer-Labor party suffered crushing
defeats, losing most of their congressional seats, and Republi-
cans badly defeated both Philip LaFollette and Elmer Benson
in their gubernatorial reelection campaigns. 72 Although un-
happy about the Republicans gaining eighty-one seats in the
House, eight seats in the Senate, and thirteen governorships,
the President wrote a postelection letter to his friend, Ambas-
sador to Mexico Josephus Daniels, in which he noted that some
good things had occurred: "We have on the positive side elimi-
nated Phil LaFollette and the Farmer-Labor people in the
Northwest as a standing Third Party threat."7 3
Despite the defeats, however, President Roosevelt made an
effort to win maximum support for his third-term race and to
integrate non-Democratic reformers into the party. In June
1939 Roosevelt told Henry Wallace and Harold Ickes of his de-
sire to work out an alliance between Wisconsin Progressives
and Democrats whereby the Democrats would support Progres-
sive Bob LaFollette for reelection as Senator and the Progres-
sives would back a Democratic gubernatorial candidate with
progressive views. Roosevelt thought that "in this way Wiscon-
sin [could] be won" for the Democratic presidential ticket.74 In
Minnesota, the Democratic National Committee, with
Roosevelt's backing, worked to link the weakened Farmer-La-
bor party with the Democrats, hoping that the two parties could
eventually be merged.7 5
2. Communist and Fellow-traveler Support
To further quell dissension, the President met twice in
early 1939 in the White House with Howard Costigan, head of
the then Communist-dominated Washington Commonwealth
Federation. Costigan, who had been actively pressing for
Roosevelt's third term, together with California Governor
Culbert Olson, the former chairperson of the EPIC movement,
planned a meeting in Salt Lake City to set up an eleven-state
Western Commonwealth Federation to unite the Left and New
72. See W. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 4, at 271.
73. Letter from Franklin Roosevelt to Josephus Daniels (Nov. 14, 1938), re-
printed in 2 F.D.R.: His PERSONAL LETEsmS 1928-1945, at 827 (E. Roosevelt ed.
1950) (emphasis added).
74. 2 H. IcKEs, supra note 70, at 654.
75. See 1 J. Haynes, Liberals, Communists, and the Popular Front in Min-
nesota: The Struggle to Control the Political Direction of the Labor Movement
and Organized Liberalism, 1936-1950, at 107, 109-11, 177-79 (Ph.D. dissertation,
Department of History, University of Minnesota, 1978).
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Deal activists. According to a report by Drew Pearson and Rob-
ert Allen, the President encouraged the "young radical" and
"assured him of full cooperation." 76 He told Costigan that he
would see to it that the administration was prominently repre-
sented at the Salt Lake conference.77
Between early 1936 and the Stalin-Hitler pact in the sum-
mer of 1939, and again immediately following the June 22, 1941,
invasion of the Soviet Union, the Communists and their fellow-
travelers played an important role in Roosevelt's efforts to co-
opt the Left. The Communists saw Roosevelt and the New
Deal as the American form of the Popular Front, the alliance of
all "progressive" anti-fascist forces that they worked for in all
democratic countries, and pressed every group they could influ-
ence to back him.78 Because of their links to the Russian
Revolution and the Third International and their ultra-leftist
policies prior to the 1936 shift to the Popular Front strategy,
Communists were perceived by many as the extreme left of
radicalism. This made it easier for Socialists and other non-
76. See A. Acena, supra note 5, at 285. Material in Pearson and Allen's col-
unm relating to Costigan's meeting with President Roosevelt was omitted from
the version printed in the Seattle Post-Intelligencer. See id. at 286 for a discus-
sion of the possible reasons for this omission.
77. Id.
78. In a discussion of the Communist party's support of President
Roosevelt and the New Deal during the period from 1936 to 1939, Maurice Is-
serman notes:
[B]y a happy coincidence for the Communists, the 1935 Congress
of the Communist International made it legitimate for the American
[Communist party] to moderate its political position at about the same
time that Franklin Roosevelt was moving to the left to build popular
support for the New Deal. The Communists began to identify them-
selves as part of the political coalition that supported the New Deal's
domestic programs, while enthusiastically welcoming every move by
the Roosevelt Administration that could be interpreted as favoring col-
lective international security. The Communists argued that their own
political program corresponded to Roosevelt's true intentions, which,
they said, were frustrated by a reactionary Supreme Court, Congress,
and press. Supporting both the Soviet Union and the New Deal, the
Communists could continue to think of themselves as revolutionaries
even as they immersed themselves in reform-oriented day-to-day
politics.
M. ISSERMAN, WiCH SIE WERE You ON? 3-4 (1982). Such day-to-day politics
included.
support [for] reactionaries under certain conditions, as was the case in
[the Communist party's] endorsement of Mayor Hague of Jersey City.
The [1943] endorsement was given on the ground that the Hague
machine supported Roosevelt, and also in order to head off a labor re-
volt that was threatening to develop into a third party movement [ca-
pable of splitting] Roosevelt's support in the State.
Moore, The Communist Party of the USA: An Analysis of a Social Movement
39 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 31, 41 (1945).
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Communist radicals and progressives to back Roosevelt. If the
"Left," as the Communists and their allies were usually de-
scribed by the media and anti-Communist investigative agen-
cies, could support Roosevelt, oppose the formation of a third
party, and favor a collective-security foreign policy, then others
could also accept such policies without fear of betraying a radi-
cal or progressive position. Within both the labor and youth
movements, the Communists provided an impetus for actual or
potential radical groups to accept the liberal New Deal position
as the best obtainable in this period.
3. Limits on Roosevelt's Coalition Tactics
There were limits, of course, to how far President
Roosevelt would go to extend or preserve his coalition. John L.
Lewis had increasingly criticized the administration during its
second term, in general for not backing the C.I.O. and other un-
ions in different strike situations and in particular for not giv-
ing unions representation in the top rungs of government.7 9 To
appease the labor and liberal critics who considered President
Roosevelt's second term too conservative, Lewis suggested to
the President in January 1940 that he be named as the vice-
presidential candidate on the President's third-term ticket. Ac-
cording to an account by Francis Perkins, Roosevelt's Secretary
of Labor, Lewis told the President that "[a] strong labor man
would insure full support, not only of all the labor people but of
all the liberals."80 For some months after President Roosevelt's
promise to consider the suggestion, Lewis warned that he
would refuse to reveal to Secretary Perkins whether he would
support the administration on various bills until the President
had "come to some conclusions" about "some suggestions" he
had made to him earlier. Roosevelt, of course, never did agree
to Lewis's "suggestion."8 1
Roosevelt's efforts to enlarge and maintain his coalition
were not limited to his dealings with those to his political left.
A major part of his electoral and congressional support came
from southern whites and Catholics. Thus, although Roosevelt
was probably more open to sympathetic discussions with black
leaders and more supportive of their requests than previous
Presidents, he refused to press for measures, such as an anti-
79. See M. JosEPHsoN, supra note 50, at 475.
80. F. Pumns, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEw 127 (1946).
81. See id.
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lynching bill, likely to alienate white southerners. 82
Similarly, Roosevelt's dependence on Catholic support
made him unresponsive to the Left's concerns during the Span-
ish Civil War. Although the Left urged support of the Loyalist
cause, Roosevelt insisted on maintaining an embargo on the
supply of arms to both sides, even though the embargo effec-
tively inhibited only the Loyalists because Franco's forces had
other sources of supply. Roosevelt's Spanish policy was un-
doubtedly influenced by his awareness that the Catholic part of
his coalition was pro-Franco:
Pro-Loyalist intellectuals were a negligible political force compared
to the large bloc of pro-Franco Catholics .... [T]he Catholic press and
hierarchy were uniformly pro-Franco, and polls revealed that the pro-
portion of Catholics who backed Franco was more than four times as
great as the proportion of Protestants.... Roosevelt told [Harold Ick-
es] that to raise the embargo "would mean the loss of every Catholic
vote next fall .... "83
IV. CONCLUSION
The Great Depression had a major long-term impact on
American society and politics. The welfare-planning state be-
came a national commitment and the bases of support of the
major parties were realigned. The Democrats became the party
of the workers and the minorities, particularly the blacks, the
Jews, and the Catholics. Trade union members, those in the
C.I.O. slightly more than those in the A.F.L., also voted over-
whelmingly for the Democrats. Conversely, those segments of
the business elite that previously backed the Democrats shifted
their support to the Republicans. Contributions from trade un-
ions, however, provided the Democrats with a new financial
base that replaced the lost business and bank support.84 Sa-
muel Lubell, who conducted in-depth interviews of many voters
82. See supra note 63. Walter White, former president of the NAACP, re-
ported that President Roosevelt expressly admitted this policy to him in a pri-
vate discussion at the White House. Roosevelt told White "I did not choose the
tools with which I must work." F. FREIDEL, supra note 63, at 86; W. WroTE,
supra note 64, at 169. Nevertheless, Mr. White, according to his own account,
remained committed to the President for years to come, primarily because of
Eleanor Roosevelt's involvement in the cause. See F. FREIDEL, supra note 63, at
71-103; W. WEr=T, supra note 64, at 168-69.
83. W. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 4, at 224 (footnote omitted).
84. See, e.g., W. BURNHAm, CRrICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF
AMERICAN POLITICS (1970); A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES,
THE AMERICAN VOTER 153-60, 534-36 (1960); E. LADD JR. & C. HADLEY, TRANSFOR-
MATIONS OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM: POLrICAL COALrIONS FROM THE
NEw DEAL TO THE 1970s 31-87 (1975); J. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY
SYSTEM 183-217 (1973); Ogburn & Hill, Income Classes and the Roosevelt Vote in
[Vol. 68:273
PROTEST MOVEMENTS
in 1940, concluded that the support for Roosevelt and his pro-
grams constituted "a class-conscious vote for the first time in
American history .... The New Deal appears to have accom-
plished what the Socialists, the I.W.W. [Industrial Workers of
the World] and the Communists never could approach. It has
drawn a class line across the face of American politics." 85
Although party divisions came to be more class-based, ef-
forts to build a national left-wing third party clearly failed. By
the end of the decade, the Socialist and Communist parties re-
ceived far fewer votes than in 1932, despite the growth in the
Communist party's membership. The absence of protest or
popular support cannot explain the failure of third-party ef-
forts. The mass demonstrations and organization of the unem-
ployed, the aggressive tactics and radical views expressed by
major farm groups, the widespread militancy and disdain for
private property exhibited by large groups of workers, the left-
ist views expressed by large minorities in the opinion surveys,
the strong electoral support given to leftist third parties and or-
ganized factions within the major parties in New York, Wash-
ington, Wisconsin, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon, and
California, and the growth of class divisions and consciousness
all attest to the vigor and extent of the anti-capitalist feeling re-
sulting from the Great Depression. This economic crisis
presented American radicals with their greatest opportunity in
the twentieth century to build a third party. The formation of
such a party in Canada, where socialist and labor movements
had been weaker prior to the 1930s, demonstrates that under
other political conditions discontent could have been used for
such purposes. As noted previously, the failure of American
radicals and third-party advocates can be explained in part by
the unique attributes of the American electoral system. Inher-
ent in the American focus on the direct election of the Presi-
dent are factors that sustain the two-party system. A
parliamentary system, in contrast, encourages groups with re-
gional or occupational strength to seek separate representation.
But the fortuitous circumstances that brought Franklin
Roosevelt, a brilliant master politician, to the White House
from 1933 on, and the conscious attempts on the part of
Roosevelt and his colleagues to incorporate all forms of protest
1932, 50 POL. Sci. Q. 186 (1935); Snively, A Reinterpretation of the New Deal Re-
alignmen4 35 Pus. Op. Q. 621 (1971-72).
85. Lubell, Post-Mortem: Who Elected Roosevelt, SAT. EvE. POST, Jan. 25,
1941, at 9. See also S. LuBELT, THE FuTURE OF AMERICAN Pourrics 55-68 (3d ed.
1965).
1983]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
in the New Deal coalition, also contributed to the failure of the
third-party movement. Roosevelt responded both in policy and
rhetoric to various outgroups and co-opted their leaders, gath-
ering them into his following. He met the demands of the dis-
contented by aiding the unemployed, promoting legislation and
administrative policies supportive of labor organization, design-
ing programs to increase farm prices and to lift the income floor
of workers, developing various social security and welfare pro-
grams, and attacking oratorically the power and income of the
wealthy and the large corporations and banks. Moreover,
Roosevelt opened the White House to the leaders, sometimes
down to the second echelon, of diverse protest groups, includ-
ing some dominated by Communists. People as varied as Wal-
ter White, Upton Sinclair, Floyd Olson, Robert LaFollette Jr.,
Tom Amlie, Norman Thomas, David Dubinsky, Sidney Hillman,
John L. Lewis, William Green, and innumerable others in the
labor and leftist movements visited the White House to talk
with the President. The famed Roosevelt charm, the sense of
aristocratic status, proved effective with most.
Norman Thomas, one of the few leftist leaders whom the
President could not recruit, noted that in discussions with radi-
cals, Roosevelt placed himself on the left, in favor of the ulti-
mate achievement of the reform that most concerned his
visitor. Thomas described a 1935 visit to the White House on
behalf of southern sharecroppers as follows:
[Roosevelt] really handled interviews his own way. He tried to
keep the conversation in his own hands. He did it rather charmingly
.... And so it was this time. He began to tell me about his wrath
about some chamber of commerce at some meeting ....
[And Roosevelt stressed to me:] "I know the South and there is
arising a new generation of leaders in the South and we've got to be
patient."86
The President was still trying nine years later. In 1944 he
replied to a telegram of congratulations from Thomas, who had
run against him for the fourth time, saying: "I was amused dur-
ing the campaign to think that now I am very far to the left of
you. Do come to see me one of these days."87
The President recognized that the long-range interests of
his coalition and the Democratic party were best served by en-
couraging radical groups, whether inside or outside the party,
to feel as though they were part of his political entourage.
Thus, he showed a willingness to endorse local and statewide
86. See F. FREIDE1, supra note 63, at 65-66 (quoting Norman Thomas).
87. See E. ROBiNSON, THE ROOSEVELT LEADERSHIP 1933-1945, at 341 (1955).
[Vol. 68:273
PROTEST MOVEMENTS
third-party or independent candidates and to give them a share
of the federal patronage in their areas. In return, they were ex-
pected to support the President's reelection and to help him in
other situations. Time and again between 1935 and 1940, meet-
ings to lay the basis for a national third party went awry be-
cause those involved recognized that the bulk of their
constituencies favored reelecting the President. And in the last
analysis, most of the radical, labor, and minority group leaders
supported the President as well. Certainly these leaders ob-
jected to particular Roosevelt policies, to his compromises with
conservatives, or to his refusals to back their group or organiza-
tion in some major conflict. Nevertheless, they invariably con-
cluded that a government in which they could play a part,
which had shown some responsiveness to their concerns, which
was open to their suggestions, and which acknowledged their
importance was far preferable to its more conservative alterna-
tive with strong links to the business community.
Franklin Roosevelt, aided by his wife Eleanor and bol-
stered by the support of the Communists, clearly deserves a
considerable amount of credit or blame for defusing the discon-
tent of the Great Depression. In many ways, the conclusions of
various New Left revisionist historians are correct; the ultimate
long-range impact of the Roosevelt Presidency was a conserva-
tive one. He helped preserve the basic integrity and legitimacy
of American capitalism by his willingness to transform it by, as
he once put it, making major changes that avoided a threat to
the system itself. Yet, as John Garraty has emphasized, "to-
day's radicals" fail to understand the sense of participation in a
great movement for social change that Roosevelt provided to
the less privileged. "[T]he blacks, the poor, and the unem-
ployed voted overwhelmingly for Roosevelt ... not because, as
the modern radicals would have it, they were 'seduced' by his
'rhetoric.' New Deal efforts, however incompletely successful,
gave the victims of the depression a sense of being part of a
massive national struggle .... -88 Regardless of how one eval-
uates the achievements of the New Deal, it would seem possi-
ble to agree with the thrust of Norman Thomas's one-word
answer to the question of why a significant socialist party did
not emerge in the 1930s: "Roosevelt."89
88. Garraty, Radicalism in the Great Depression, in ESSAYS ON RADICALISM
in CoNTEmPoRARY AMERICA 81, 113-14 (L. Blair ed. 1972).
89. D. SHANNON, THE SOCIAUST PARTY OF AMERICA 248 (1967) (quoting The
Reminiscences of Norman Thomas, pt. I, 65 (Columbia University Oral History
Project, Columbia University Library)).
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Still, it must be noted that the economic growth and high
levels of social mobility in the post-war era gradually reduced
the impetus to class-based politics and trade unionism in the
United States stimulated by the 1930s. Studies of elections re-
veal that the correlation between class and party that grew in
the depression decade has been curtailed sharply in recent
years.90 At least as significant is the steady drop in the propor-
tion of the nonagricultural labor force belonging to trade unions
from close to 33% in the 1950s to 15% in 1983.91
These developments suggest that the social forces that un-
dernine class-conscious politics in the United States, although
weakened in the 1930s, revived in the post-war decades. Hence,
it may be argued that even if a socialist movement comparable
to that of Canada had emerged during the 1930s, it would have
lost much of its strength in more recent times. National opin-
ion surveys taken in 1976 and 1981 reinforce this conclusion:
the percentage of Americans favoring socialism in those years
stood at 10-12%, compared with 25% in 1942. In addition, over
90% of all Americans typically endorse free enterprise. 92 The
socialist movement in Canada is also experiencing a decline.
The social-democratic New Democratic Party lost control of its
hold on the government of the three provinces, British Colum-
bia, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan, which it had controlled, and
at present its standing in national polls has fallen to 15%.
In 1906, Werner Sombart queried: "Why is there no social-
ism in the United States? '93 This conundrum, which has puz-
zled students of comparative politics and frustrated radicals,
still faces us. Although primary responsibility must be placed
on basic differences in structures and values between America
and other industrialized countries, it remains true that social-
ists missed their greatest opportunity to build a party during
the 1930s in part because of the way Franklin Roosevelt dealt
with efforts to mobilize discontent.
90. See S.M. LIPSET, supra note 1, at 504-05.
91. See The De-unionisation of America, THE ECONOMIST, October 29, 1983,
at 71.
92. See S.M. LPSET & W. SCNEiDER, supra note 24, at 282.
93. W. SOMBART, WARUM GIBT ES IN DEN VEREINIGTEN STAATEN KEINEN
SOZIAI sMus? (1906).
[Vol. 68:273
